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I. INTRODUCTION  
Sometimes, courts find that a manager or director of a business entity was 
disloyal.1  The fiduciary duty of loyalty is a lofty standard.  A defendant does not 
have to stray far to offend “the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive.”2 
Under such a standard, exonerating a defendant may be difficult, even when 
it is the right thing to do.  A defendant who is not pure as the driven snow may still 
                                                            
* Professor of Law, South Texas College of Law. 
1 E.g., Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, LLC, 40 A.3d 839 (Del. Ch. 2012), aff’d, 59 A.3d 
1206 (Del. 2012); In re Southern Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60 (Del. Ch. 
2011); Johnston v. Pedersen, 28 A.3d 1079 (Del. Ch. 2011); Wash. ex rel. Hayes Oyster Co. v. 
Keypoint Oyster Co., 391 P.2d 979 (Wash. 1964); see Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Coughlin, 255 S.W.3d 
424 (Ark. 2007); Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989). 
2 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, J). 
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not deserve liability.  A judge with high standards may decline to approve of the 
defendant’s conduct but still want to reach the right result.  When courts decline to 
find disloyalty, they give various reasons: the disloyalty was waived,3 the conduct 
was ratified by an appropriate constituency,4 or the conduct was fair.5   
But sometimes courts talk as if certain conduct is privileged, as if some right 
owned by the defendant trumped the duty of loyalty.  Generally, it is a right given 
in the code without a hint that it relates in any way to the duty of loyalty.6  I find 
this talk troubling.  The duty of loyalty is the bedrock of investor expectations.  
The duty requires that defendants act in good faith, i.e., that their actions serve a 
purpose of the entity and are not intentionally or in conscious disregard of the 
rights of investors.7  The duty demands that fiduciaries refrain from serving their 
own interests to the entity’s detriment.8  Loyalty also ensures that corporate 
democracy, when in place, is not undercut.9  Without this guardian doctrine, those 
entrusted with the business of others could unjustly enrich themselves or squander 
assets with impunity.  Methods of unfair opportunism available to insiders are 
endless.  Only an open-ended duty could catch them all. 
That is why talk of privilege or right to act notwithstanding loyalty is a 
concern.  Nearly any absolute privilege to act, given the right circumstances, can 
be used disloyally.  Courts’ stating that a corporate actor—a partner, a LLC 
manager, a majority shareholder, or anyone—has a privilege to do any act 
notwithstanding the interests of investors is an invitation to those actors to use that 
privilege to cheat.  Many fiduciaries, given long-term control of a business, can 
wait for or even slowly manufacture a circumstance in which the privilege can give 
them the unfair advantage they seek.  And, if a right to cheat is attached to some 
corporate status, others will seek that status not for its inherent worth or the power 
it gives to serve others but for the power it gives to take from others, thus 
depriving investors of their fair return and the entity of its efficiency. 
All this is true no matter what view of fiduciary duties one espouses.  For 
instance, it is common to see fiduciary duties as contractual.10  Some might believe 
that loyalty is merely the default rule parties would have chosen but for the 
                                                            
3 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8  § 122(17) (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 17-1101(c) 
(West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 § 18-1101(c) (West 2010); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 
2.101(21) (West 2007); TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. § 152.002 (West 2007); UNIF. P’SHIP. ACT § 103 
(1997). 
4 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 144 (West 2010) (Delaware’s so-called “safe harbor” statute); 
TEX. BUS. ORGS. CODE ANN. §§ 21.418 & 101.255 (West 2011) (Texas’s attempt to create a true safe 
harbor); Rev. Model Bus. Corp. Act § 8.61. 
5 See, e.g., Cookies Food Prods, Inc. by Lakes Warehouse Distrib, Inc., 430 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 
1988). 
6 That is true with respect to the three cases discussed in this article.  See Covalt v. High, 675 P.2d 
999 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 674 P.2d 521 (N.M. 1984); North-West Transp. Co. v. Beatty, 
[1887] 12 App. Cas. 589 (P. C.); Thorpe v. CERBCO, Inc., 676 A.2d 436 (Del. 1996). 
7 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369–70 (Del. 2006); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 
A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006). 
8 E.g., In re Southern Peru Copper Corp. S’holder Derivative Litig., 30 A.3d 60 (Del. Ch. 2011). 
9 E.g., MM Companies, Inc. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118, 1127–32 (Del. 2003); Blasius 
Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 660–61 (Del. Ch. 1988); Schnell v. Chris-Craft, Indus., Inc., 
285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. 1971). 
10 Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response to the Anti-
Contractarians, 65 Wash. L. Rev. 1 (1990). 
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transaction costs of bargaining.11  I am a believer in contractual freedom and the 
general ingenuity of people to solve their problems by agreement, but I am 
skeptical of this justificatory move.  It is possible that this method of analysis 
allows any (or nearly any) current state of the world to be justified.  After all, this 
supposition that people have or would have agreed is largely a thought experiment 
engaged in by very creative people not bound by time, real world costs, heuristics, 
or prejudices.  I never saw a client like that.  For the contractarian view of 
fiduciary duties to generate a judicial conclusion that a right trumps a duty of 
loyalty, one would have to conclude that the investors agreed to allow the 
managers to do what would otherwise be a disloyal act.  The trumping position 
itself allows the fiduciary a right to act in its own self-interest and opposed to the 
interests of investors.  Given that the situation requires a trumping rationale, no 
explicit waiver of the duty of loyalty exists that covers the act, and no ratification 
has occurred.  Moreover, the fiduciary’s conduct is egregious enough that the court 
is hesitant to find it fair.  The danger of present and future opportunism is obvious.  
Supposing that investors have agreed to this in advance is literally incredible. 
Some believe that fiduciary duties are, and should be, not contractual but 
inherent and mandatory in certain relationships.12  On this view, if fiduciary duties 
apply, no contractual arrangement can qualify them.  This theory regards fiduciary 
duties as necessary to protect the weaker party in a relationship13 and third parties 
who deal with the fiduciary.14  With respect to the weaker party, Professor Gordon 
Smith’s critical resources theory of fiduciary duties explains why.15  In this view, 
                                                            
11 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 15 
(1996). 
12 See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 BOSTON U. L. REV. 
1039, 1046 (2011) (“[T]here is a mandatory core . . . that cannot be overridden by agreement.”); Larry 
A. DiMatteo, Policing Limited Liability Companies Under Contract Law, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 279 (2009); 
Sandra K. Miller, Fiduciary Duties in the LLC: Mandatory Core Duties to Protect the Interests of 
Others Beyond the Contracting Parties, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 243 (2009); Daniel Kleinberger, Seven Points 
to Explain Why the Law Ought Not Allow the Elimination of Fiduciary Duty Within Closely Held 
Businesses: Cardozo Is Dead; We Have Killed Him (William Mitchell College of Law, Working Paper 
No. 61, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=948234 (last visited Feb. 14, 2013); Mark 
Loewenstein, Fiduciary Duties and Unincorporated Business Entities: In Defense of the “Manifestly 
Unreasonable” Standard, 41 TULSA L. REV. 411 (2006); see also, e.g., Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 
304, 416–17 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).  The Dolan court opined, regarding a general partner’s management 
discretion, 
[T]hat discretion was encumbered by a supreme fiduciary duty of fairness, 
honesty, good faith and loyalty to his partners. Language in an agreement such as 
“sole discretion” does not metamorphose the document into an unrestricted 
license to engage in self-dealing at the expense of those to whom the managing 
partner owes such a duty.  Defendants cite no authority, and we find none, for the 
proposition that there can be an a priori waiver of fiduciary duties in a 
partnership—be it general or limited. 
Id. at 416–17.  The court did not foreclose forever the possibility of an a priori waiver, see id. at 417, 
but the court’s analysis strongly suggests that, if a duty of loyalty remained necessary at all to protect 
the parties, the court would find that it was not covered by whatever waiver had occurred. 
13 See Sitkoff, supra note 12, at 1047. 
14 See Miller, supra note 12, at 243. 
15 D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399 
(2002).  Professor Smith claims his view is consistent with the notion that fiduciary duties are 
contractual.  Id. at 1491–93.  However, nothing in his view requires any connection between fiduciary 
duties and contract.  If Smith is correct about fiduciary duties, it is not clear that the fiduciary duty, 
technically speaking, could ever be waived or modified; it would simply be displaced to the extent of 
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“fiduciary relationships form when one party . . . acts on behalf of another 
party . . . while exercising discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to 
the beneficiary.”16  It is apparent in that description that fiduciaries, even those 
violating fiduciary duties, always claim as a factual matter to be acting according 
to right; the right gives them the discretion required under this definition of the 
duty.  The fiduciary duty exists to rein in the fiduciary’s discretion notwithstanding 
the fiduciary’s rights.  Thus, fiduciary duties, particularly the vital duty of loyalty, 
“protect[] beneficiaries against opportunistic behavior by fiduciaries.”17  This 
purpose and facet of fiduciary duties virtually requires condemnation of a right that 
allows a fiduciary to disregard loyalty.  Only a cold and ineffective logic would 
free the fiduciary from the duty of loyalty for the exercise of some selective rights.  
To do so would invite opportunism and thus undercut the entire fiduciary 
enterprise as the theory describes it. 
It is the thesis of this paper that no privilege to act disloyally exists: that a 
power to act never trumps the duty of loyalty.  My method is to discuss three cases 
in which the privilege or power to act appears to receive judicial support.  The 
paper shows why this strategy does not work.  Such assertions have no support in 
logic (and usually not in law), provide a slippery slope at the bottom of which the 
duty of loyalty ceases to exist, often result in a decision being internally 
inconsistent, and fail to stand the test of time.  I will do my best to unwind the 
harm these cases might cause.  My hope is that those reading this paper will take 
its criticism to future cases so that this kind of argument can be defeated elsewhere 
in the law, and so that courts will not assert such things in the future.  There is 
always a better, wiser course for the law. 
II.  COVALT V. HIGH (N.M.  CT. APP. 1983)18 
A. The Case 
Covalt v. High reports a dispute between William High and Louis Covalt.  
High owned 75% of the shares of Concrete Systems, Inc. (“CSI”).19  Covalt owned 
25% of CSI’s shares.20  High was president of CSI, and Covalt was vice-president.  
Both received remuneration from CSI “in the form of salaries and bonuses.”21 
                                                            
the waiver or modification, and if it were displaced completely, then it never would have existed.  
Under Smith’s terms, a fiduciary duty exists if the relationship gives another party discretion with 
regard to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary.  Id. at 1402.  A contract purporting to waive 
such a duty would either describe the required conduct, in which case there would be no discretion, or 
entirely undercut the idea that the resource was critical.  There simply would be no fiduciary and no 
fiduciary duty.  There can be neither waiver nor modification of something that does not exist.  And if 
the premises of the fiduciary relationship remain to any extent, then presumably the duty remains, too, 
notwithstanding a contract, to the extent the relationship has not been displaced.   Whether that 
technical argument is accepted or not, Smith’s description of the grounds of fiduciary duties lends 
nothing to the notion that those duties might be trumped by another right.  Any other right would also 
undercut the premises of Smith’s description. 
16 Id. at 1402. 
17 Id. 
18 Covalt v. High, 675 P.2d 999 (N.M. Ct. App. 1983). 
19 Id. at 1000. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
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In 1971, Covalt and High agreed to form a partnership.  Covalt and High 
became equal partners.22  The partnership bought real property and built an office 
and warehouse.  In 1973, CSI leased the building from the partnership for a five-
year term.  Substantial improvements that CSI made to the leasehold over the five-
year term were to belong to the partnership at termination.  The term ended in early 
1978, after which CSI remained in possession as a tenant without a term.23 
Late in 1978, Covalt resigned his corporate position and went to work for a 
competitor of CSI.  Covalt remained a partner with High in the partnership.  Covalt 
soon wrote to High demanding that CSI’s rent increase from $1,850 to $2,850.  
High responded that he would see if rent could be raised, but he took no action.24 
Covalt then sued High, alleging that High had breached his fiduciary duties 
as a partner.  Covalt also sued CSI and High seeking dissolution of CSI.  The two 
cases were consolidated.  The trial court bifurcated Covalt’s claim for loss of rental 
income from the other issues, partly because Covalt and High settled before trial 
all the remaining partnership issues by selling the partnership property and 
agreeing to a settlement of the partnership affairs.25 
At trial, High testified that CSI could not afford a higher rent.  The trial court 
held, however, that this was incorrect, that CSI could afford to pay $2,850, and that 
$2,850 would have been a reasonable monthly rent.26  The trial court then held that 
High had breached his fiduciary duty of “utmost fairness” to Covalt and ordered 
High to pay damages.27  High appealed. 
The court of appeals, which reversed, did not spend much time explaining 
the trial court’s ruling.  The court of appeals seemed not to want to recognize the 
fiduciary duty issue.  When it recited the issue before the court, it omitted fiduciary 
duty, recasting the issue as if it were a management decision: “Can a partner 
recover damages against his co-partner for the co-partner’s failure or refusal to 
negotiate and obtain an increase in the amount of rental of partnership property?”28 
When it came time to describe the fiduciary duties of partners, the court 
admitted, 
[T]he formation of a partnership creates a fiduciary relationship between partners.  
The status of partnership requires of each member an obligation of good faith and 
fairness in their dealings with one another, and a duty to act in furtherance of the 
common benefit of all partners in transactions conducted within the ambit of 
partnership affairs. . . . “[A] partner must account for any profit acquired in a 
manner injurious to the interests of the partnership . . . .”29 
                                                            
22 Id. at 1001 (“High paid Covalt . . . for his one-half interest as partner . . . .”). 
23 Id. at 1000. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 1000–01. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 1001. 
28 Id. at 1000. 
29 Id. at 1001 (quoting J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 68 
(1968)).  New Mexico law clearly provides that partners are fiduciaries.  See Citizens Bank of Clovis v. 
Williams, 630 P.2d 1228, 1230 (N.M. 1981) (“It is true that partners occupy a fiduciary duty towards 
one another.”); Cave v. Cave, 474 P.2d 480, 484 (N.M. 1970) (holding in particular that a managing 
partner owes the other partner a fiduciary duty (High was the managing partner, 675 P.2d at 1001)); 
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But then the court proposed a competing principle: “Except where the 
partners expressly agree to the contrary, it is a fundamental principle of the law of 
partnership that all partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of 
the business of the partnership.”30  Where the partners differ as to a matter, “the 
decision of the majority must govern.”31 
Without any discussion of how the two principles relate to each other, the 
court declared that High’s right to equal management fully justified his refusal to 
raise the rent.32  A disagreement between partners is resolved by majority vote, the 
court said.33  Of course, here there were only two partners.  So the court turned to 
treatises naming a rule for deadlocked management:  
If the parties are evenly divided as to a business decision affecting the partnership, 
and in the absence of a written provision in the partnership agreement providing for 
such contingency, then, as between the partners, the power to exercise discretion on 
behalf of the partners is suspended so long as the division continues.34   
The application of that principle in this case, the court said, was that “an act 
involving the partnership business may not be compelled by the co-partner.”35  
Citing an Idaho case in which partners disagreed over whether to hire a new 
employee but in which no partner had a conflict of interest and no allegations were 
made of breach of fiduciary duty, the court asserted that the rule was 
“mandatory.”36   
On that analysis, the court held “that one partner may not recover damages 
for the failure of the co-partner to acquiesce in a demand by the plaintiff that High 
negotiate and execute an increase in the monthly rentals of partnership property 
with CSI.  Thus, there was no breach of a fiduciary duty.”37  The Covalt decision 
has been cited for managerial rights trumping duty of loyalty.38  The Covalt court 
                                                            
Rogers v. Stacy, 318 P.2d 1116, 1117 (N.M. 1957) (“A trust relation exists among partners.”). 
30 Covalt, 675 P.2d at 1002. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. 
33 Id.  
34 Id. at 1002 (citing NATHANIEL LINDLEY, ET AL. A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 354 
(E. Scamell, 12th ed. 1962) (“[I]f the partners are equally divided, those who forbid a change must have 
their way.”) and J. M. BARRETT & ERWIN SEAGO, PARTNERS AND PARTNERSHIPS LAW AND 
TAXATION, ch. 5, § 7, at 484 (1956) (“If the partners are unable to agree and if the partnership 
agreement does not provide an acceptable means for settlement of this disagreement, the only course of 
action is to dissolve the partnership.”). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. (citing Summers v. Dooley, 481 P.2d 318, 320 (Idaho 1971)). 
37 Id. at 1003. 
38 E.g., Mack v. Mack, 613 N.W.2d 64, 68 (S.D. 2000); Sanchez v. Saylor, 13 P.3d 960, 977 (N.M. 
App. 2000); Shuster v. Lyons, Memorandum of Decision, 1997 WL 472419 *5 (Conn. Super. Ct., Aug. 
7, 1997).  The court’s reasoning is criticized in Claire Moore Dickerson, From Behind the Looking 
Glass: Good Faith, Fiduciary Duty & Permitted Harm, 22 FLA. ST. L. REV. 955, 973 n.75 (1995) (“I 
find the decision mechanical and wrong-headed.”).  Dickerson sees the court as balancing High’s duties 
to the corporation as against his duties to the partnership, id., but this would be an obvious mistake.  If 
High has put himself into a position in which he has conflicting duties, the presence of the conflicting 
duties is no reason to breach one of them.  The Covalt court did not suggest it was balancing High’s 
duties.  Though Dickerson thinks High breached his duty of loyalty, she recognizes that the decision 
may well rest on a kind of waiver, as the court also said and as I explain infra in the text following this 
footnote. 
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concluded this issue by suggesting that Covalt should have dissolved the 
partnership.39 
Perhaps feeling that it had not fully justified ignoring High’s disloyalty, the 
court also tried another way.  The court noted that conflicts of interest between 
Covalt and High existed from the time the partnership formed.40  Even in 1973, the 
court said, both were “aware of the potential for conflict between their duties as 
corporate officers . . . and that of their role as partners in leasing realty to the 
corporation for the benefit of the partnership business.”41  The conflicts continued, 
of course, after Covalt’s resignation from employment at CSI.  Then the court 
draws this conclusion: “Each party’s conflict of interest was known to the other 
and was acquiesced in when the partnership was formed.”42   
B. Analysis 
i. Criticism 
Covalt’s reasoning about High’s right to manage does not justify its 
conclusion that the duty of loyalty does not apply or was trumped.  Most 
obviously, if High had a management right to decide what to do with the rent, then 
he had both the ability to decide not to raise it and the ability to raise it.  In other 
words, the court translates High’s right to disagree with Covalt into a disability: 
that High cannot act.  But that neither follows from the premise, nor is this 
conclusion true.  In fact, High’s management rights gave him a choice whether to 
raise the rent.  High’s duty of loyalty is logically independent of his management 
right and can function consistently with it.43  If High’s duty of loyalty required him 
to raise the rent, it is no defense to say that he had a power to decide otherwise.  
His duty of loyalty required him to decide to exercise his management right in 
favor of the partnership and his partner. 
Imagine the parade of horribles if what the Covalt court said was true.  Every 
management act that was disloyal could hide behind a manager’s right to decide.  
This would not necessarily be restricted to management deadlock.  In a 
partnership, majorities rule in most cases.  If two partners wanted to cheat a third, 
then so long as they made a decision, the other’s recourse could only be dissolution 
as quickly as possible.  If High had a management right to ignore what loyalty 
would otherwise require of a single partner in a deadlock, would he not have even 
more right if he were two of three partners?  Under Covalt’s reasoning, there could 
                                                            
39 Covalt, 675 P.2d at 1003. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 For example, the power or right to manage and the duty of loyalty are expressed in separate code 
sections.  See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 18(e) & 2; REV.UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §§ 401(f) & 404 (1997).  The 
code does not purport to establish a hierarchy between them.  They appear both to apply where their 
texts say they will apply, even when the two rules cover the same factual scenario.  In fact, the two rules 
answer very different questions.  One asks whether the partner has the authority, vis-à-vis the 
partnership, other partners, and in some cases a third party (see, e.g., UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 9(1) (“unless 
the partner … has in fact no authority”); REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 301(1) (“unless the partner had no 
authority”) (1997)), to do a certain act.  The other rule asks whether in doing an act the partner was 
disloyal.  The logic is just the same if two partners vote against one another. 
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be no disloyalty.  Anytime action was taken pursuant to managerial decision, the 
action could not be challenged. 
The source of the Covalt court’s thinking on this issue may be the superficial 
notion that a disloyal act is not allowed because it is not authorized.  Perhaps the 
court believed that, because High acted within his authorized management rights, 
loyalty was not an obstacle. This notion does not withstand scrutiny, however; it 
fundamentally misunderstands the relationship between management power and 
loyalty. 
The partner has equal rights in the management of the partnership not 
because the other partner or partners have authorized them.  The equal right in 
management is not given by the other partners like agency authority is given by 
principals.  Instead, the equal right to manage follows from the partner’s status as a 
co-owner of the partnership business.44  As comments to the Revised Uniform 
Partnership Act put it, “A business is a series of acts directed toward an end.  
Ownership involves the power of ultimate control.  To state that partners are co-
owners of a business is to state that they each have the power of ultimate 
control.”45  That is why what Covalt says about High’s management rights is 
correct as a matter of management rights.  High had management rights because he 
was a co-owner of the partnership; ownership gave High “the power of ultimate 
control.”46 
This power of management is not obtained from the other partners, like the 
authority of an agent.  It exists despite what the other partners do, unless a majority 
of the other partners decide otherwise, in which case the ownership of the 
partnership has spoken otherwise.47  Both the rule cited in Covalt and the case 
National Biscuit Co. v. Stroud48 illustrate the point.  Stroud and Freeman’s 
partnership operated a grocery store.49  Stroud called Nabisco and told them he 
would not be responsible for any more bread ordered by Freeman.50  Freeman 
thereafter ordered bread, and then the partnership dissolved.51  The court addressed 
whether Stroud was liable as a partner for the partnership’s obligation to pay for 
the bread.52  While Freeman as a partner was generally an agent for the 
partnership’s business,53 the court had to ask whether this was the partnership’s 
business.  Though Stroud’s action indicated it was not, Freeman’s independent 
management right meant that it was, necessarily: “Stroud . . . could not restrict the 
power . . . of Freeman to buy bread for the partnership as a going concern, . . . 
because in the very nature of things Stroud was not, and could not be, a majority of 
the partners.”54  A right to manage, including a right to determine the direction of 
                                                            
44 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6(1); REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997). 
45 REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202 cmt, 1 (1997). 
46 Id. 
47 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 18(h); REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(j) (1997). 
48 Nat’l Biscuit Co. v. Stroud, 106 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. 1959). 
49 Id. at 693. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 695 (citing North Carolina’s analog to UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 9(1)).   
54 Stroud, 106 S.E.2d at 695. 
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the business, is what defines a co-owner.55 
Whatever else we can say about High, then, we cannot say that he lacked the 
right and therefore the power to determine the direction of the business.  He was, 
after all, a co-owner.  However, in a partnership, that a person is an owner and has 
the management rights of an owner over a business does not mean that person has 
absolute power, because in a partnership there is more than one owner.  The 
partners are “co-owners.”56  Each has the same power.  Obviously some limitations 
must be placed on that power.  Two beings cannot have unbridled power over the 
same object any more than an unstoppable force can push aside an immovable wall 
or an omnipotent being can create a rock so large she cannot move it. 
The code therefore mediates between the powers.  The most obvious 
mediation is that, when a difference arises “as to ordinary matters connected with 
the partnership business[,] . . . a majority of the partners” resolves it.57  If the 
matter is “outside of the ordinary course of business,” the management right to do 
the act exists “only with the consent of all of the partners.”58 
The other primary mediation made by the code between the partners’ power 
as co-owners is the duty of loyalty.  Loyalty bridles ownership power; otherwise, 
no act of the partner done pursuant to the partner’s power to manage could be 
disloyal.  Nearly everything a partner does is pursuant to the power to manage, and 
frequently these acts could be disloyal.  Because the partner manages partnership 
property, the partner may change the locks (though this may exclude a partner).  A 
partner may decide to hire a new employee (who may turn out to be the partner’s 
nephew).  A partner may take the books home to examine them (which would 
deprive another partner of doing the same).  A partner may sell partnership 
property, especially products the partnership sells in its business, and may set the 
price (though this sale may be to the partner for a bargain price).  And a partner 
may buy property for the partnership’s business (though this may be from the 
partner at a price that is more than the property is worth).  A partner as part owner 
and as manager has power to do each of these acts.  If the partner acting as owner 
has power to act despite the disloyal harm she visits on her partners, then the duty 
of loyalty means nothing.  If a partner who has ownership power to do all these 
things is freed from loyalty by virtue of that power, there is no duty of loyalty. 
In fact, it is the power in the partner that makes the duty of loyalty vital.  
Recitation of even the most classic partnership cases proves the point.  In 
Meinhard v. Salmon,59 Salmon leased a building and then solicited Meinhard to 
put up money with a plan to renovate the building and sublease out parts as shops 
                                                            
55 Against the suggestion that High and Stroud conflict because one says that in a deadlock the 
partners cannot act and the other says they can, I suggest that the partners’ status as co-owners meant 
that their management rights cannot be limited by the other partner.  In High, the partner was minded to 
keep the rent the same.  In Stroud, the partner was minded to order more bread.  The management rules 
recited in the two cases give the partner power to do either, whichever and whatever he was minded to 
do.  That is because a partner is a co-owner, not merely an agent of the partnership.  I thank Gary Rosin 
for calling attention to the potential conflict. 
56 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 6(1); see also REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 202(a) (1997). 
57 UNIF. P’SHIP ACT §18(h); see also REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(j) (1997). 
58 REV. UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 401(j) (1997). 
59 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928). 
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to tenants.60  The two were to split the profits at certain percentages over the years 
that remained on the lease.61  “Salmon . . . was to have sole power to ‘manage, 
lease, underlet and operate’ the building.’”62  When the lease was about to end, the 
lessor proposed to Salmon another long-term lease during which the building 
would be torn down and a new one built in its place.63  Salmon signed onto this 
new deal only through Midpoint Realty Company, which he solely owned.64  He 
entered into this lease by himself, just as he had the first one.65  But this time he 
failed to tell Meinhard anything about it.66  When Meinhard later asserted an 
interest in the deal, Salmon refused him.67 
There was no question that the management authority was all Salmon’s.  But 
that authority did not allow Salmon to ignore his duty to Meinhard.  Cardozo 
reasoned: 
Equity refuses to confine within the bounds of classified transactions its precept of 
a loyalty that is undivided and unselfish. Certain at least it is that a ‘man obtaining 
his locus standi, and his opportunity for making such arrangements, by the position 
he occupies as a partner, is bound by his obligation to his copartners in such 
dealings not to separate his interest from theirs, but, if he acquires any benefit, to 
communicate it to them.’ . . . . 
Salmon had put himself in a position in which thought of self was to be renounced, 
however hard the abnegation. He was much more than a coadventurer. He was a 
managing coadventurer. . . . For him and for those like him the rule of undivided 
loyalty is relentless and supreme . . . . Here the subject-matter of the new lease was 
an extension and enlargement of the subject-matter of the old one.  A managing 
coadventurer appropriating the benefit of such a lease without warning to his 
partner might fairly expect to be reproached with conduct that was underhand, or 
lacking, to say the least, in reasonable candor, if the partner were to surprise him in 
the act of signing the new instrument. Conduct subject to that reproach does not 
receive from equity a healing benediction.68 
Management power is what gives the partner power to harm his fellow 
partner.  Whether the source of the duty of loyalty is contractual or relational, the 
duty of loyalty exists so that this power is not misused.69  To say that the power 
trumps the duty is like saying that the gas pedal trumped the brake and therefore no 
speeding tickets are allowed. 
ii. Solution 
High’s power to set rent could therefore not be grounds for him to ignore 
                                                            
60 Id. at 545. 
61 Id. at 545–46. 
62 Id. at 546. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 548. 
69 See, e.g., Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d at 308. 
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Covalt’s interests.  Fortunately, the court sensed as much and offered an alternative 
ground.  At first, the court’s other ground seems as ill-conceived as its first.  The 
court says, merely, that each party was “aware of the potential for conflict between 
their duties as corporate officers . . . and that of their role as partners in leasing 
realty to the corporation for the benefit of the partnership business.”70  The 
conflicts continued, of course, after Covalt’s resignation from employment at CSI.  
Then the court draws this conclusion: “Each party’s conflict of interest was known 
to the other and was acquiesced in when the partnership was formed.”71  As the 
court states it, this reasoning makes no sense.  Acquiescence in a conflict of 
interest is not a waiver of cheating behavior.72  Business people acquiesce in 
conflicts because they trust the other party will not cheat, not because they have 
resigned themselves to become victims of whatever harm the other party inflicts. 
Nevertheless, on the facts, the court is pointing in the right direction.  The 
business structure High and Covalt built together included a partnership that 
owned property and was to distribute profits equally.73  That partnership leased 
property to a corporation, shares of which High owned 75% and Covalt 25%.74  
Both were officers, and both received remuneration in the form of salaries and 
bonuses.75  There is no reason that both Covalt and High could not be happy with 
this structure.  In fact, there is no reason that they could not take home equal 
amounts of pay under this structure.  There is no mention of dividends in the case; 
most likely the two principals drew profits from the business solely in the form of 
salary and bonuses.  If their salaries and bonuses were equal, then the two made 
equal amounts from the corporation and partnership together, even though the two 
owned different percentages of stock.  In that case, both were benefitting equally 
from the low rent.   
On the other hand, equal pay seems unlikely.  High was, after all, the higher 
officer and the owner of more shares.  Covalt quit, not High, nor did Covalt appear 
able to force High out.  If High’s and Covalt’s salary and bonuses differed in 
amount, it seems likely that High’s exceeded Covalt’s.  If Covalt was taking home 
less in salary and bonuses from the corporation than High, then the below-market 
rent that the corporation paid actually benefitted High more than Covalt.  This is 
                                                            
70 Covalt, 675 P.2d at 1003. 
71 Id. 
72 For example, a lawyer may represent business people forming a business, even a partnership; 
two parties forming a contract; two spouses divorcing; a criminal defendant who is allowing another to 
pay for the representation; or an insured and an insurance company paying for the defense.  The ethical 
lawyer obtains an informed waiver of the conflict from the two clients or potential clients.  ABA 
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 1.7(a), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_7_conflict_of_in
terest_current_clients.html (last accessed Oct. 17, 2011).  But when the situation changes and the 
interests of the parties conflict so that “the representation of one client will be directly adverse to 
another client” or “there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will be 
materially limited” by duties to anyone else, including the lawyer, then the lawyer must withdraw.  Id. 
at 1.7(a) and cmts. ¶¶ 4–5, http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/rule_1_7_conflict_of_interest_current_clients/com
ment_on_rule_1_7.html (last accessed Oct. 17, 2011).  Acquiescence in a conflict does not justify the 
lawyer’s cheating one client for another, or for himself. 
73 Covalt, 675 P.2d at 1000. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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true because the savings from paying a below-market rent were divided between 
the two unevenly, more to High than to Covalt.  Covalt had thus already 
acquiesced in a departure from even-handedness, though perhaps he did not realize 
this. 
Moreover, Covalt had to realize that, if he quit, he would immediately be cut 
off from what thus far had been, by agreement if not in fact, a fair division of 
profits for the business as a whole.  The immediate cause of the unfair distribution, 
then, and Covalt had to know this, was Covalt’s actions, not High’s refusal to act.  
When Covalt quit, he necessarily gave up the salary and bonuses.  This may well 
have rendered his stock worthless, without dividends.  The result was that the 
benefit of a below-market rent went, or went more obviously, to High. 
The court assessed Covalt’s litigation position at this point.  What the court 
saw then was that, for several years, Covalt was happy with what probably was a 
slightly unfair arrangement and with the knowledge that, if he resigned, an 
obviously unfair one would result.  But it was one that happened by Covalt’s own 
agreement.  The greater unfairness that later came about occurred first of all 
because Covalt voluntarily caused it.  There is no allegation that High forced 
Covalt out.  It seems odd for Covalt to quit and then demand, for the first time, that 
High pay more.  The rent that Covalt had approved before (perhaps even though 
unfair to him) was no longer acceptable to him, and the change that made it 
unacceptable was entirely his own action.  Does Covalt’s decision to decline the 
salary and bonuses that made the rental arrangement acceptable to him mean that 
High must re-arrange the rent, particularly if benefits from below-market rent were 
spread unevenly all along?  Presumably the gains from the business were a 
package deal, and Covalt and High had their reasons for dividing them between 
partnership and corporation as they did.  These reasons now no longer apply, 
because Covalt quit, but does that mean the court should remake the deal the way 
Covalt wants it?   
The partnership was at will, apparently, and dissolution would have given 
Covalt his interest in the property, as later occurred.76  Given Covalt’s likely prior 
acquiescence and his creation of the situation that made the below-market rate 
intolerable to him, and the ease of dissolution, I am satisfied to interpret the court 
as saying it would not remedy a breach of duty even if one occurred—not because 
High had a management right, but because he did nothing disloyal, or nothing 
disloyal that the court could remedy in any way but to remake the deal Covalt 
himself had made and now regretted.  Is that a waiver?  I am comfortable with the 
idea that whatever rights Covalt may have had at one point to a fair rental rate are 
suspect because he cannot use the court to remake the business deal that Covalt 
and High had struck.  I think the court reached the right result on this ground, 
though stated obtusely.  In fairness, the deal between Covalt and High can only be 
seen by looking outside—by looking between—the strict legal categories of 
corporation, partnership, and contract.  But there is no reason that deal should not 
govern.  And this ground is much preferable, safer jurisprudentially, and more 
                                                            
76 I infer this from the court’s conclusion that Covalt should have dissolved the partnership.  Id. at 
1003.  The parties, months after the split (but before trial), dissolved the partnership by agreement, and 
High paid Covalt $170,000 in cash, plus installment payments the amount of which is not clear from the 
opinion.  Id. at 1001. 
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logical than holding that management rights trump a duty of loyalty.  Covalt, if it is 
to survive as a precedent, should be construed to mean only this. 
III. NORTH-WEST TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, LTD. V. BEATTY77 
A. The Case 
James Hughes Beatty was the sole owner of a steamship called “United 
Empire.”78  Beatty was also a director of North-West Transportation Company, 
Limited (NWT), a Canadian joint stock company.79 
The bylaws of NWT specified that its board should have five directors, and 
that each director should hold five shares in the company.80  Directors were elected 
at the annual shareholders meeting on the first Wednesday in February, at which 
meeting each share cast one vote per issue.81 
The directors of NWT had the power to enact bylaws.82  But every board-
enacted bylaw was enforceable only until the next annual meeting of shareholders, 
at which time shareholders would give these bylaws an up or down vote.  
Shareholders might also approve bylaws by special meeting, but board-enacted 
bylaws failing to receive shareholder confirmation ceased to have force.83 
NWT was organized for shipping.  In late 1882, it lost one of its steamships, 
the “Asia.”84  Another ship, the “Sovereign,” was considered unsuitable.85  The 
“United Empire,” owned by Beatty, was under construction but nearly finished.86 
At the end of 1882, Beatty owned 200 shares of NWT, one-third of the total 
of 600.87  On January 31, 1883, Beatty purchased 101 shares from S. Neelon, who 
was then a director.88  Beatty therefore had more than half the shares.  The next 
largest shareholder was Beatty’s brother Henry, with 120 shares.89  Neelon had 
held third-most,90 so Beatty now controlled far and away more shares than any 
other shareholder. 
On the morning of February 7th, Beatty transferred five shares each to Rose 
and Laird, which qualified them to serve as directors.91  This reduced Beatty’s 
shares to 291, fewer than half. 
The annual shareholders meeting for the year 1883 was held on the 7th of 
                                                            
77 North-West Transp. Co. v. Beatty, [1887] 12 App. Cas. 589 (P.C.).  
78 Id. at 593. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 594. 
81 Id. at 594–95. 
82 Id. at 594. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 595. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 597. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
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February after Beatty’s transfer to Rose and Laird.92  At the meeting, Beatty, Rose, 
and Laird were elected directors.93  Then a discussion took place regarding the 
“United Empire.”94  The shareholders resolved to hold a special shareholders 
meeting on the 16th of February for the purpose of voting on a bylaw for the 
purchase of the “United Empire” and also to consider whether to sell the 
“Sovereign.”95 
In between shareholders’ meetings, on the 10th, however, the directors met 
(in the absence of Brother Henry) and resolved by bylaw to purchase the “United 
Empire” for $125,000.96  An agreement between Beatty and NWT was recited to 
the board before the vote.97  The agreement was later executed at the same 
meeting.98 
At the shareholders meeting on the 16th, the shareholders adopted the bylaw 
by a majority of votes.99  Beatty, Rose, Laird, and William Beatty voted in favor, 
casting 306 votes.100  Against the measure, Henry and three other shareholders cast 
289 votes.101  Henry then sued to set the sale aside. 
The suit twisted up through the courts, the Chancellor setting the sale aside, 
citing Beatty’s conflict; the Court of Appeal of Ontario reversing, citing 
shareholders’ rights; the Supreme Court of Canada reversing again; and the Privy 
Council in turn reversing the Supreme Court, thus affirming the transaction.102 
The Privy Council’s reasoning focused on a shareholder’s rights and 
downplayed a director’s duty, which is why the case appears in this article.  In 
upholding the transaction, the court said, 
[T]he constitution of the company enabled the defendant J. H. Beatty to acquire this 
voting power; there was no limit upon the number of shares which a shareholder 
might hold, and for every share so held he was entitled to a vote; the charter itself 
recognised the defendant as a holder of 200 shares, one-third of the aggregate 
number; he had a perfect right to acquire further shares, and to exercise his voting 
power in such a manner as to secure the election of directors whose views upon 
policy agreed with his own, and to support those views at any shareholders’ 
meeting; the acquisition of the United Empire was a pure question of policy, as to 
which it might be expected that there would be differences of opinion, and upon 
which the voice of the majority ought to prevail; to reject the votes of the defendant 
upon the question of the adoption of the bye-law would be to give effect to the 
views of the minority, and to disregard those of the majority.103 
The Council reasoned that “great confusion would be introduced into the affairs of 
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95 Id. at 595. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. at 596. 
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joint stock companies if the circumstances of shareholders, voting in that character 
at general meetings, were to be examined, and their votes practically nullified, if 
they also stood in some fiduciary relation to the company.”104  The Council’s 
statement of the rule also seems to favor shareholder rights: 
The general principles applicable to cases of this kind are well established. Unless 
some provision to the contrary is to be found in the charter or other instrument by 
which the company is incorporated, the resolution of a majority of the shareholders, 
duly convened, upon any question with which the company is legally competent to 
deal, is binding upon the minority, and consequently upon the company, and every 
shareholder has a perfect right to vote upon any such question, although he may 
have a personal interest in the subject-matter opposed to, or different from, the 
general or particular interests of the company.105 
The passage seems to say that a shareholder, perhaps even a majority shareholder 
but in any event a more or less controlling shareholder such as Beatty, has an 
absolute right to vote any way he wants, and that this trumps whatever duty of 
loyalty he may have to the company or the minority whether as director, officer, or 
shareholder.  On these facts, it is difficult to read in any other way the court’s 
statement that “every shareholder has a perfect right to vote” however he may, 
“although he may have a personal interest in the subject-matter opposed to . . . 
the . . . interests of the company.”106   
 In fairness, the Council also paid homage to the duty of loyalty: 
On the other hand, a director of a company is precluded from dealing, on behalf of 
the company, with himself, and from entering into engagements in which he has a 
personal interest conflicting, or which possibly may conflict, with the interests of 
those whom he is bound by fiduciary duty to protect . . . .107 
But the Council wrote what it thought should happen if the right and duty 
conflicted, and it seems here that the right may trump: “Any such dealing or 
engagement may, however, be affirmed or adopted by the company, provided such 
affirmance or adoption is not brought about by unfair or improper means, and is 
not illegal or fraudulent or oppressive towards those shareholders who oppose 
it.”108  The proviso in this sentence does not seem to apply to the transaction.  
Rather, it applies only to the vote (“such affirmance or adoption”), so that if the 
vote is done fairly, the vote appears to control notwithstanding unfairness in the 
transaction.109  And when the court examined unfairness in the Beatty case, it 
examined facts surrounding the vote.  It noted that Rose and Laird testified that 
there was no agreement or understanding between either of them and Beatty with 
regard to the purchase of the “United Empire.”110  They admitted that before 
Beatty transferred shares to them, they thought the purchase would be beneficial, 
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109 See also id. at 600 (“In form and in terms they adopted it by a majority of votes, and the vote of 
the majority must prevail, unless the adoption was brought about by unfair or improper means.”). 
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“that they accepted the shares with the view of becoming directors,” and that 
Beatty knew of their opinions.111  Rose said “he would not have joined the 
company” had not NWT intended to buy the boat.112  None of these facts 
amounted to unfairness in the vote, and therefore the vote was effective to affirm 
the transaction.113  The only hint that the court is concerned with the fairness of the 
transaction comes early in the opinion, which mentions that “another steamer . . . 
was essential to the efficient conduct of the company’s business; that the United 
Empire was well adapted . . . and that the price agreed . . . was not excessive or 
unreasonable.”114  But these facts receive no further mention and appear to play no 
role in the court’s analysis. 
 
B. Analysis 
i. Criticism 
The danger of the Privy Council’s rhetoric in Beatty, of course, is that the 
majority will be able to vote themselves unfair benefits—that NWT will pay too 
much for the United Empire.  If the vote of the majority cannot be questioned, then 
that vote and the transaction it approves will stand even if Beatty caused NWT to 
pay too much for the boat.  Declaring that the majority shareholder has a “perfect 
right to vote”115 for deals in his own favor might gut the duty of loyalty. 
Beatty is a much-cited precedent, and sometimes it has been cited for this 
sort of overbalance toward a shareholder’s right to vote.  In Western Ontario 
Natural Gas Co. v. Aikens,116 majority shareholders took company bonds in 
exchange for their shares as a step in financing a company expansion, then later 
presented this deal to all the shareholders for their approval, which was 
obtained.117  In response to the company’s complaint against the majority 
shareholders, the court quoted from Beatty the “perfect right to vote” language and 
found that there was no attempt to deceive the shareholders at the meeting.118 
Perhaps the worst example of taking Beatty too far is Whitlam v. Australian 
Securities and Investment Commission.119  In this case, the director was given 
directions to vote shares by proxy and was accused of breaching that duty by 
failing to vote the shares at all.120  The shares he failed to vote were sufficient to 
block a resolution whose claimed passage may well have occurred only because of 
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116 Western Ontario Natural Gas Co. v. Aikens, [1946] 4 D.L.R. 647 (Can. Ont. Sup. Ct.). 
117 Id. ¶¶ 13–27. 
118 Id. ¶¶ 56, 59. 
119 (2003) 57 NSWLR 559 (Austl.), available at http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/scjudgments/ 
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the director’s failure.121  In discussing the issue, the court paid homage to the right 
to vote identified in Beatty: 
Indeed, if the member directs the proxy/director to vote in a way that the director 
believes is not in the interests of the company, the director will generally, as the 
member’s fiduciary, be obliged to vote in that way; and generally, this will not be 
in breach of the director’s duties to the company.  Even in voting their own shares, 
directors do not generally owe a duty to act in the interests of the company. In 
North-West Transportation Co. Ltd v. Beatty . . . the Privy Council found to be 
legitimate the narrow approval by shareholders of a contract between a 
director/shareholder and the company to buy a boat from him, in circumstances 
where most of the votes cast in favour of the resolution were those of the 
director/shareholder himself.  The Court found that all shareholders, including a 
majority shareholder, are entitled to vote in the manner they wish, provided it is not 
unfair, improper, illegal, fraudulent or oppressive towards those shareholders 
opposing the resolution: see Ford, Principles of Corporations Law, 11th Ed. at 548. 
As there noted, that decision has not been departed from in Australia, although 
there may be circumstances in which a director/shareholder may come under a 
fiduciary duty to other shareholders (see Brunninghausen v. Glavanics (1999) 46 
NSWLR 538), and there have been some statutory qualifications to the principle. 
But the general principle is that directors voting their own shares can vote in their 
own interests, and are not bound by their duty as directors to act in the interests of 
the company as a whole.  In our opinion, the position must be similar in relation to 
a director voting as proxy on the instructions of other shareholders, in the sense that 
the director can (and as a fiduciary should) vote as directed by those shareholders, 
and in doing so is not subject to a duty as director requiring that he or she vote in 
accordance with what he or she believes is in the best interests of the company. 
Thus, although there may be circumstances in which a director acting as proxy is 
discharging a director’s duties, this is not necessarily the case.122 
The proposed analogy is striking: If the voting procedure itself is not unfair, the 
director can vote as the director wishes, just as the director as proxy may vote 
shares contrary to the interests of the entity and without fiduciary duties to anyone 
but the shareholder designating the proxy. 
Under this rhetoric, the director is completely released from the duty of 
loyalty with respect to the substance of the vote.  The director’s right to vote 
appears to trump. 
ii. Solution 
The rhetoric of Beatty is merely that—rhetoric, it turns out.   
Simply put, Beatty’s language just does not mean what it appears to mean.  
The rhetoric focuses on the director’s voting rights only and fails to include the 
factual context of the case.  That factual context severely limits Beatty’s reach.  By 
focusing solely on the majority’s right to bind, and describing the director’s right 
to vote her own shares as a “perfect right,” the court misleads readers into thinking 
it is asserting something absolute or unconditional. 
In fact, the Beatty court resolved a very narrow issue, namely, whether an 
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interested director’s vote in favor of a conflicted transaction violates a duty of 
loyalty when that transaction is fair.  The trial court found the transaction in Beatty 
fair, a conclusion the Privy Council found on appeal to be “substantially admitted”: 
It is proved by uncontradicted evidence, and is indeed now substantially admitted, 
that at the date of the purchase the acquisition of another steamer . . . was essential 
to the efficient conduct of the company’s business; that the United Empire was well 
adapted for that purpose; that it was not within the power of the company to acquire 
any other steamer equally well adapted for its business; and that the price agreed to 
be paid for the steamer was not excessive or unreasonable.123 
Because the transaction was fair, the question in Beatty was whether voting one’s 
own interests was itself, regardless of the issue of fairness, a breach of loyalty.  
Putting the factual context back in shows just how little Beatty means: Interested 
directors may vote for a fair transaction without breaching the duty of loyalty. 
This is not a controversial holding; it is now a widely adopted principal.  
Section 144 of Delaware’s Interested Director statute holds flatly that a conflicted 
transaction is not void or voidable solely because the conflicted “director’s or 
officer’s votes are counted” in favor of the transaction if the transaction “is fair as 
to the corporation” when the meeting occurs.124 
Oberly v. Kirby125 proves the point.  Two directors of a non-profit 
corporation, the Kirby Foundation, also sat on the board of Alleghany 
Corporation.126  Those directors voted to approve the redemption by Alleghany of 
Alleghany stock owned by the Kirby Foundation.127  The redemption was 
challenged by the Delaware Attorney General.128  The court, applying the same 
standards it applies to for-profit corporations,129 held that the transaction was 
intrinsically fair, notwithstanding the conflicted votes.130  The mere fact of the 
vote, therefore, was not disloyal. 
The simple truth is that, in Beatty, the finding of fairness to the company 
essentially did away with the disloyalty claim.  Voting for a fair transaction is not 
disloyal.  This actually is all that the court said, despite its inflated language. 
The other two cases that recite and purport to extend Beatty’s inflated 
rhetoric handle the exact same narrow issue.  In Aikens, the court also found that 
the transaction itself, not just the vote, was fair,131 even though this factual issue 
was not relevant under any of the rules the court cited.  In Whitlam, the court held 
                                                            
123 Beatty, [1887] 12 App Cas 589, 596 (P.C.). 
124 DEL. GEN. CORP. LAW § 144(a)(1) (2012).  The Delaware statute’s language is widely adopted.  
See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 29-406.70 (2001); GA. CODE ANN. § 46-3-305 (1981); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
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125 592 A.2d 445 (Del. 1991). 
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129 Id. at 466–68. 
130 Id. at 470–72. 
131 Western Ontario Natural Gas Co. v. Aikens, [1946] 4 D.L.R. 647, ¶ 59–60. 
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that the pleadings did not raise the issue of whether the director had breached a 
fiduciary duty, so the recitation of the Beatty language in that case was entirely 
dicta. 132 
A recent case, In re Hillcrest Housing Ltd.,133 gets this same point, but the 
factual context is clear.  The court explicitly addressed the narrow question of 
“whether directors are allowed to vote on a contract in which they have an 
interest.”134  The court made it clear that whether voting on a conflicted transaction 
was disloyal would depend on the facts.135  If disclosure was inadequate, the court 
implied that the mere act of voting might be disloyal.136  That is how the court 
interpreted Beatty’s prohibition against a fraudulent vote,137 but clearly 
hoodwinking shareholders into voting for a transaction in which a director is 
interested would be unfair in itself, and it would suggest that the transaction, which 
the director wanted to hide, was also unfair.  In other words, the issue is the 
fairness of the transaction.  If the transaction is fair, the majority shareholder is 
allowed to vote for it. 
 Conversely, if the transaction is not fair, the majority shareholder and director 
should have no rights.  This is confirmed in the cases, too.  When the factual 
context has changed, and there is no finding that the transaction is fair, courts 
quickly jettison Beatty.  The now-aged case of Cook v. Deeks138 is a good example.  
In Cook, as the more-recent Brandley v. Hinman139 accurately reports, “[T]wo of 
three directors of a company negotiated for themselves a contract with another 
company which they had a duty to obtain for their company.  They then used their 
controlling votes at a shareholders’ meeting to pass a resolution that the company 
had no interest in the contract.” 140In holding that the directors breached their duty 
of loyalty, the court reasoned, 
If, as their Lordships find on the facts, the contract in question was entered into 
under such circumstances that the directors could not retain the benefit of it for 
themselves, then it belonged in equity to the company, and ought to have been dealt 
with as an asset of the company. Even supposing it be not ultra vires of a company 
to make a present to its directors, it appears quite certain that directors holding a 
majority of votes would not be permitted to make a present to themselves. This 
would be to allow a majority to oppress the minority. To such circumstances the 
cases of North-Western Transportation Co. v. Beatty [and the like] . . . have no 
application.141 
In other words, the issue is loyalty.  Only when loyalty is not at issue may courts 
trumpet voting rights.  No one has a right to be disloyal. 
The Beatty case can be analogized to a line of Delaware cases (called 
                                                            
132 Whitlam v Australian Sec. & Invs. (2003) 199 ALR 674, ¶ 162–65. 
133 Hillcrest Housing Ltd. (1998) 165 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 181. 
134 Id. ¶ 316. 
135 Id. ¶ 316–17. 
136 Id. ¶ 317. 
137 Id. ¶ 321. 
138 Cooks v. Deeks, [1916] 1 A.C. 554 (P.C.) (Ont.). 
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informally the Solomon line) in which the courts have been more careful with their 
rhetoric.  Consider the way the Solomon-line rule is phrased: “[A] controlling 
shareholder extending an offer for minority-held shares in the controlled 
corporation is under no obligation, absent evidence that material information about 
the offer has been withheld or misrepresented or that the offer is coercive in some 
significant way, to offer any particular price for the minority-held stock.”142  Here, 
too, as in Beatty, the court appears to have announced a right, as if one could be 
free from an obligation to be loyal.  In the Solomon line of cases, loyalty is the 
issue, just as in Beatty.  But in the court’s phrasing of the rule in the Solomon line, 
unlike in Beatty, the implicit conditional is made explicit.  No doubt an exchange 
offer accompanied by trickery or coercion would be disloyal.  But if there is no 
trickery and no coercion, so that minority shareholders are able to make what is 
probably as close to a market decision as could be made in this instance, then 
merely offering an exchange is not disloyal.  And no doubt a vote for an interested 
transaction when the transaction is unfair is disloyal, but if there is no unfairness in 
the transaction because the transaction serves a corporate need, the board is 
informed in all material respects, and the price is fair, then voting for the exchange 
is not disloyal.  Beatty’s perfect right to vote is just a contingent right, imperfectly 
expressed. 
IV. THORPE V. CERBCO, INC. (DEL. 1996) 143 
A. The Case 
I confess to being a bit surprised by this case.  I did not expect a rhetorical 
slip from this court on such a central issue.  Nevertheless, I believe that is what 
Thorpe is. 
“George and Robert Erikson were directors, officers, and controlling 
shareholders of CERBCO.”144  The Eriksons owned 24.6% of CERBCO’s total 
equity, 56% of CERBCO’s total votes, and enough Class B shares to elect 75% of 
CERBCO’s board.145  The Eriksons were in fact two of CERBCO’s four 
directors.146  CERBCO was “a holding company with voting control of three 
subsidiaries.”147 
This case involved the business of one of these three subsidiaries, Insituform 
East, Inc. (“East”).148  East’s business exploited technology obtained (licensed) 
from Insituform of North America, Inc. (“INA”) that allowed East to repair pipes 
without removing them.149  In the fall of 1989, INA considered purchasing one of 
                                                            
142 In re Ocean Drilling & Exploration Co. S’holders Litig., CIV A. No. 11898, 1991 WL 70028, 
*334 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 1991); see also Solomon v. Pathe Commc’ns Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996); 
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its licensees.150  INA analyzed (in part through its investment banker, Drexel, 
Burnham) public information about East and prepared to make an offer.151  It 
arranged financing for an offer.152  INA’s chairman, planner, and negotiator 
Krugman wrongly assumed, however, that East had a single class of shares.153  
East, like CERBCO itself, had a dual class and was controlled by CERBCO in 
much the same way the Eriksons controlled CERBCO itself, mostly through 
ownership of its Class B shares.154 
INA met with the Eriksons to discuss the acquisition.155  Not knowing East’s 
capital structure, or CERBCO’s, presumably INA met with the Eriksons because 
they were directors of CERBCO.156  In the meeting, the Eriksons proposed that 
INA, rather than buy East, instead purchase the Eriksons’ interest in CERBCO.157  
The Eriksons led INA to believe that they would block a sale of East to INA.158  
With this new information, INA considered buying (1) all of CERBCO’s interest 
in East or (2) most (and a controlling number) of the Eriksons’ CERBCO Class B 
shares.159 
The Eriksons did not inform CERBCO’s two outside directors of INA’s 
interest.160  Instead, they told them INA was interested in buying the Eriksons’ 
shares of CERBCO.161  One of the two, Davies, suggested instead “that CERBCO 
sell East to INA, but Robert Erikson rejected this idea.”162  Davies later asked in a 
CERBCO board meeting if “INA had ever been interested in buying East.”163  The 
Eriksons responded that INA had never made an offer and that, had INA done so, 
the Eriksons would have vetoed it.164 
The CERBCO board gave INA access to CERBCO’s books and records, and 
consented to the Eriksons’ use of CERBCO’s lawyer as their personal counsel in 
negotiations with INA.165  In March of 1990, the Eriksons and INA signed a letter 
of intent in which INA agreed to buy for $6 million the Eriksons’ controlling share 
of CERBCO.  Thorpe, a CERBCO shareholder, made a demand in May that 
CERBCO sue the Eriksons over this.166  Thorpe filed suit in August, alleging that 
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the Eriksons had breached their duty of loyalty.167  Negotiations between INA and 
the Eriksons never led to a sale, however, and the letter of intent expired in 
September.168  Apparently, one of the sticking points was indemnification for 
litigation costs, including for defense against Thorpe’s claims and a pending SEC 
suit.169 
The Chancellor upheld Thorpe’s corporate opportunity claim against motions 
to dismiss and for summary judgment.170  At trial, the court found that the Eriksons 
breached their duty of loyalty by failing to inform the CERBCO board of INA’s 
interest in East and by negotiating with INA in their own behalf.171  Nonetheless, 
the Chancellor awarded no damages because “the defendants[‘] actions were 
wholly fair. . . . .  First, no sale had occurred and therefore damages were 
speculative.”172  Second, 
§ 271 confers upon the Eriksons the right to veto any corporate change constituting 
the sale of substantially all of the corporation’s assets.  Under the facts of this case, 
any alternative transaction conceivably undertaken by CERBCO would implicate 
the provisions of § 271 and therefore be subject to disapproval by the Eriksons.  
[Therefore,] . . . the Eriksons could not be penalized for their breach . . . .173 
The Delaware Supreme Court framed its review of the Chancellor’s decision 
by positing a conflict between controlling shareholders’ “right to sell their shares” 
and their duty of loyalty.174  Initially, the court seemed to give loyalty its due: 
The shareholder vote provided by § 271 does not supersede the duty of loyalty 
owed by control persons, just as the statutory power to merge does not allow 
oppressive conduct in the effectuation of a merger.  Rather, this statutorily 
conferred power must be exercised within the constraints of the duty of loyalty.175 
So the court affirmed the finding that the Eriksons were disloyal.176  They should 
have told CERBCO of INA’s interest, the court said, after which the Eriksons 
would have been free to compete with CERBCO for it.177  Their failure to disclose 
was a disloyal omission. 
That conclusion sounds as if a remedy is warranted, but not so fast, the court 
said.  After finding a breach, the trial court had examined the transaction for 
fairness, but this court said instead that the corporate opportunity doctrine was a 
better analytical tool.178  The court then explained that the corporate opportunity 
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doctrine prohibits a director or officer from seizing an opportunity in which the 
corporation has an interest or reasonable expectancy.179  The law prohibits this, the 
court said, because “the self-interest of the officer or director will be brought into 
conflict with that of his corporation.”180  Here, “it is clear that the opportunity was 
one in which the corporation had an interest.”181 
You might think, again, that would end the issue.  After all, the Eriksons 
clearly tried to seize the opportunity.  The interests of the Eriksons and the 
corporation clashed, and they chose themselves over the corporation.  But here the 
court makes the analytical move that causes this opinion to be of interest: 
Despite this fact, CERBCO would never be able to undertake the opportunity to sell 
its East shares.  Every economically viable CERBCO sale of stock could have been 
blocked by the Eriksons under § 271.  Since the corporation was not able to take 
advantage of the opportunity, the transaction was not one which, considering all of 
the relevant facts, fairly belonged to the corporation.182 
After affirming that CERBCO’s sale of the East stock would indeed have been the 
sale of all or substantially all of its assets, the court also reasoned, alternately, 
Because the alternative transaction would have been covered by § 271, the Eriksons 
had the statutory right as shareholders to veto this transaction.  Given their power, 
the Eriksons would obviously never allow CERBCO to enter a transaction against 
their economic interests.  Damages cannot be awarded on the basis of a transaction 
that has a zero probability of occurring due to the lawful exercise of statutory 
rights. 
. . . .  Section 271 must . . . be given independent legal significance apart from the 
duty of loyalty. . . .  [T]he Eriksons’ § 271 rights are ultimately responsible for the 
non-consummation of the transaction.  Even if the Eriksons had behaved faithfully 
to their duties to CERBCO, they still could have rightfully vetoed a sale of 
substantially all of CERBCO’s assets under § 271.  Thus, the § 271 rights, not the 
breach, were the proximate cause of the nonconsummation of the transaction.  
Accordingly, transactional damages are inappropriate.183 
This language appears to shrink in obvious ways the duty of loyalty as 
against the right of shareholders to vote for a sale of all or substantially all of the 
corporation’s assets.  The foundation of the corporate opportunity doctrine is 
loyalty,184 so if what would otherwise be a corporate opportunity is not one solely 
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because the interested director could vote against it in her own self-interest under § 
271, then the right trumps the duty.  Worse yet is the idea that no harm is 
recognized under the duty of loyalty from blocking for self-interested reasons the 
corporation’s taking advantage of a transaction.  If one can do no disloyal harm by 
exercising one’s right to vote, then the right trumps the duty. 
Worst of all is that offensive sentence regarding § 271’s independent legal 
significance.  The doctrine of independent legal significance is a doctrine of 
statutory interpretation.  In the context of rival statutory rights, it means that 
“action taken under one section of that law is legally independent, and its validity 
is not dependent upon, nor to be tested by the requirements of other unrelated 
sections under which the same final result might be attained by different 
means.”185  The clear suggestion of the court is that actions taken under § 271 are 
“not dependent upon, nor to be tested by the requirements of” the duty of loyalty.  
Congratulations, Delaware fiduciaries!  You are free to cheat so long as you can 
get what you want through your voting rights under a sale of all or substantially all 
assets. 
In the end, the court imposed a damage award for the Eriksons’ breach of 
loyalty nonetheless, for the $75,000 the Eriksons received from INA for the letter 
of intent and for costs the corporation incurred “to accommodate the Eriksons’ 
pursuit of their own interests prior to the deal being abandoned.”186  But the 
potential damage to doctrine was already done. 
B. Analysis 
i. Criticism 
The Thorpe opinion can be criticized on several grounds. 
First of all, the Thorpe opinion is internally inconsistent.  The court said that 
the opportunity to sell East to INA was “one in which the corporation had an 
interest,” but on the same page the court concluded that “the transaction was not 
one which . . . fairly belonged to the corporation.”187  On the one hand, the court 
said that “[t]he shareholder vote provided by § 271 does not supersede the duty of 
loyalty . . . [but] must be exercised within the constraints of the duty of loyalty.”188  
On the other hand, the court said, “Section 271 must . . . be given independent 
legal significance apart from the duty of loyalty.”189  These are just contradictions. 
The analysis also contains this kind of thinking.  The court said that § 271 
“must be exercised within the constraints of the duty of loyalty” and then gave no 
explanation for how the Eriksons’ actions were so constrained.190  Instead, the 
court talked as if the Eriksons’ rights made a breach of loyalty with respect to the 
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INA opportunity impossible.191  Seizing a corporate opportunity is a breach of 
loyalty, so the court’s conclusion that § 271 makes what would otherwise be a 
corporate opportunity fair game flies in the face of the court’s rhetoric about § 271 
being subject to loyalty. 
Nor does the court’s assertion that the Eriksons should have told CERBCO 
about the INA offer192 make sense when juxtaposed with the court’s later 
exoneration of the Eriksons because such a deal had “zero probability of occurring 
due to the lawful exercise of statutory rights.”193  According to the court’s analysis, 
the Eriksons breached their duty of loyalty by failing to make a futile gesture.  It 
hardly makes sense to chasten the Eriksons for not letting CERBCO compete with 
them if there was “zero probability” of CERBCO reaching a deal.  Perhaps the 
court means to suggest that the likelihood of an INA deal changed over time, but if 
that is true, then at the time of the breach there was some probability of a deal 
occurring.  However, if there was some probability at the time of the breach, then 
damages for taking it away should not be zero.  That the probability later became 
zero is beside the point.  So if the reasoning on liability is sensible, the reasoning 
on damages is not, or if the court’s reasoning on damages makes sense, it’s 
reasoning on liability does not. 
The court’s assertions about the role of the Eriksons’ blocking power are 
made doubly odd by Chancellor Allen’s decision that a trial was necessary to 
decide whether CERBCO’s sale of control of East would be a sale of substantially 
all of CERBCO’s assets that the Eriksons would have a right to vote against and 
thereby block.  If the Chancellor of Delaware did not know before trial whether the 
Eriksons had a right to block such a sale, how could the Eriksons have known, 
asserted, and relied on such a right?  And if they could not, then how does that 
right exculpate them after the fact for failure to disclose?  In fact, the Eriksons 
acted disloyally but were later represented well by a lawyer who persuaded the 
court, after the fact, to find that the Eriksons were privileged to act as they did even 
though they could not have known it at the time.  They were legally lucky, and 
that’s all.  That does not speak well for the court’s analysis. 
It’s all a bit baffling, as the court explains it.  Both courts seem to go to great 
lengths to split the Eriksons’ conduct by hairs in order to exculpate them.  It was 
wrong not to tell the CERBCO board about INA’s interest, both courts agree.  But 
neither court does more than mention in the facts that, when CERBCO director 
Davies inquired of the Eriksons “whether INA has proposed a bid to CERBCO for 
either CERBCO’s Class B shares of East or all of the East shares owned by 
CERBCO,”194 the Eriksons deliberately omitted the full story.  Recall that INA 
initially approached the Eriksons with a proposal to do just that; that is how the 
deal was initially suggested to the Eriksons.195  It would hardly make sense to hold 
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that the Eriksons had breached a duty of loyalty if that had not been the case.  And 
yet the Eriksons replied to Davies that “INA had not and that INA was only 
interested in the Eriksons’ Class B CERBCO stock.”196  This was at best a half-
truth.  To a fellow fiduciary, it was constructive fraud.  This was not to abuse 
corporate processes in favor of their own transaction?  Yet neither court so notes. 
Logical oddities are apparent even in the macro sense in the Supreme Court’s 
opinion.  A failure to disclose is a kind of disloyalty.  Taking a corporate 
opportunity is another kind of disloyalty.  Essentially, the Supreme Court here said 
that one kind of disloyalty would not be remedied with a transactional remedy 
because the defendants were not guilty of another kind of disloyalty.  That’s not a 
coherent approach.   
Chancellor Allen’s rhetorical strategy was, in contrast, logically 
unobjectionable: opine that a breach occurred but that transaction or rescissory 
damages were not warranted because the result was fair.197  But Chancellor Allen 
also privileged the section 271 voting rights of the Eriksons while limiting the 
description of the Eriksons’ fiduciary duty as a controlling shareholder in order to 
find them in breach of loyalty but also find that they were privileged to vote 
against an INA transaction.  Here is the limitation on the Eriksons’ fiduciary duty: 
“Even a large or controlling shareholder has a privilege to sell her stock for the 
best price available, at least where she does not utilize corporate processes or 
property to facilitate such sale.”198  The Supreme Court made a similar move when 
it explained, near the end of its opinion on appeal: “While the Eriksons did have a 
duty to present that opportunity to CERBCO, they had no responsibility to ensure 
that a transaction was consummated.”199  Neither explains how the Eriksons’ abuse 
of their directorial powers did not utilize corporate processes.  There is a duty of 
loyalty, apparently, but if you are a stockholder, then at certain times you can just 
ignore it. 
It also seems odd that a court famous for considering the possibility that 
people might always pay more for stock200 seems not to have considered that INA 
might actually pay enough for CERBCO’s East shares that the Eriksons would 
change their minds.  No vote was ever taken and CERBCO was prevented by the 
Eriksons’ disloyalty even from bargaining.  For the court’s argument from section 
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271 to hold water, then, it must work against any and all possible sales of 
substantially all of CERBCO’s East shares.  Otherwise, the argument could not be 
used a priori of any actual deal.201  Yet it seems obvious that facts could exist that 
would press the conflict between loyalty and section 271 voting rights to an 
extreme and at some point make even a vote under section 271 an act of disloyalty 
in fact.  Rejecting an offer of $30,000,000 for East’s shares in order to pressure 
INA to make a $6,000,000 offer for the Eriksons’ shares of CERBCO would just 
be bad faith.  The Eriksons would make far more money with the $30,000,000 
offer, so factually its rejection in favor of an offer of far less for themselves alone 
would mean ill-will.  Despite Thorpe’s rhetoric, I doubt the court would approve 
such a move.  The court was right when it said that “the shareholder vote provided 
by § 271 does not supersede the duty of loyalty owed by control persons.”202  
Section 271 does not really have independent legal significance. 
The result of these rhetorical gymnastics is inconsistency.  For failing to 
report to CERBCO a transaction that the court finds could not possibly have 
happened and the terms of which were completely unknown but that the Eriksons 
were completely justified in blocking but could not have known so at the time, the 
Supreme Court refused to require the Eriksons to pay CERBCO more than 
damages of $75,000 plus reimbursement of certain other costs CERBCO incurred 
in connection with the negotiations between INA and the Eriksons.203 
ii. Injustice? 
Initially, I suspected the Delaware courts had allowed an injustice to be done 
to CERBCO’s shareholders.  After all, why engage in such arguments unless you 
have something to hide?  But I do not think so now.  I believe the opinion was just 
not well-considered. 
First, fiduciary duties are a blunt instrument to handle a transaction that did 
not occur, because the remedies normally available do not address the corporate 
actor’s bad acts or the harm done.  Consider injunctive relief.  Now that litigation 
has concluded and everything is out in the open, CERBCO is well aware of the 
corporate opportunity, and INA can do any deal it wants with CERBCO.  There is 
no danger of the Eriksons hiding information now that it is all out in the open.  
There is no reason to think the Eriksons and INA are hiding a possible transaction 
in the background.  Injunctive relief is therefore inappropriate. 
How about a damage award?  A constructive trust?  Beyond the few benefits 
the Eriksons took during negotiations, I do not see any available measure of 
damages.  Section 271 was not the only ground for the ruling.  Chancellor Allen 
held that the damages sought by the plaintiffs were speculative.204  The plaintiffs 
proposed $5.7 million in damages.205  This is the amount, plaintiffs claimed, of 
                                                            
201 The Thorpe court examined the one other transaction it considered a “serious alternative.”  676 
A.2d at 443. 
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“the premium over market that the Eriksons would have realized in the possible 
sale of their CERBCO Class B Stock” and was, thus, “the amount over the market 
price of CERBCO’s East common stock that INA would have been willing to pay 
CERBCO for its East stock.”206  As Chancellor Allen noted, the leap from what the 
Eriksons would have received over market to what CERBCO would have received 
over market depends on assumptions, including that INA would have been willing 
to pay the same premium no matter what method of obtaining control it employed, 
and that CERBCO’s existing control over East (since CERBCO still owns it) need 
not be considered.207  But in the end the Chancellor found that “there is no 
testimony from which I am able to conclude that any offer that INA might have 
made to CERBCO is better or worse than an offer that might be had now or in the 
future.”208  A damage award would have been entirely speculative: “irrational,” 
Allen called it.209   
This is apparent.  If INA wanted to buy East from CERBCO, it certainly 
could have approached CERBCO at any moment and purchased it.  This was still 
true even after its deal with the Eriksons fell apart.  Nothing now prevents INA 
from making an offer to CERBCO.  Nothing prevents INA from making an offer 
that not even the Eriksons could refuse.  In other words, the opportunity still exists, 
now as much as it did earlier.  So damages for lost opportunity would not be 
appropriate. 
In fact, with the speculative nature of the plaintiff’s evidence in mind, one 
can, looking back on the Thorpe facts, construct an alternate rationale that fully 
justifies even the court’s use of section 271 as a ground for denying the plaintiff’s 
transactional damages, though it requires one more finding.  One must engage in a 
kind of thought experiment, and progress backward in time from conditions 
following final judgment in the case.  As the Chancellor noted, CERBCO still 
owns East.  INA could still buy it.  Of course, at this point after judgment, the 
material facts all being out in the open (this is the extra finding), the Eriksons 
could no longer be faulted for non-disclosure.  If they withdrew from activity and 
played no role in the negotiations at all, so that a deal when reached was solely the 
result of a negotiation at arm’s length between INA and CERBCO, could the 
Eriksons veto it?  I think it clear that they could.  In that case, they are acting 
fairly.  That is the key.  It is not that they are acting solely in their right as 
stockholders, as if directors could cease being directors when they want to act as 
stockholders.  Rather, they are at this point treating CERBCO fairly; their conduct 
is unimpeachable notwithstanding the conflict.210 
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But if we can construct such a hypothetical, we can also re-imagine the 
holding in Thorpe.  Essentially, the reimagined holding is this (and this is a long 
sentence, so please read it carefully): Based on the evidence presented to the court 
about the parties’ interests and bargaining positions, then even assuming (i) all the 
material facts were known to CERBCO’s board, (ii) INA was interested in buying 
East from CERBCO, and (iii) INA made a play for East that resulted in a 
transaction that was presented to CERBCO’s shareholders for a vote, the evidence 
does not support a finding that the Eriksons’ veto of that deal would have been 
unfair.  There may be some deal the veto under section 271 of which would have 
been unfair, but not one within the possibilities presented by the evidence in this 
case. 
In other words, the shareholders of CERBCO were treated fairly, as 
Chancellor Allen in the end concluded.  I believe they were, and this would have 
been the way to say it logically and plausibly, without setting up impossible 
contradictions in the law.  So the result in Thorpe is not wrong, though much of its 
rhetoric is. 
iii. Afterward 
For what it is worth, later courts, and particularly the Delaware Chancery, 
appear to have recognized Thorpe for the troubled piece of writing that it is, 
though re-writing the Thorpe precedent through subsequent decisions is a rather 
inefficient method of judicial change. 
First of all, the later Chancery Court was not so hesitant to condemn the 
Eriksons’ conduct: 
Thorpe involved a bidder who approached the management of Insituform East, Inc. 
desirous to purchase the company.  In bad faith, management withheld this 
information from the outside directors, lied by saying that the bidder had not 
expressed interest in purchasing the company, threatened to block any sale of the 
entire company, and simply informed the board a bidder wished to buy the inside 
directors’ controlling interest.211 
Second, the courts have dropped some of the odd dichotomies.  A federal 
court in Illinois recited that the Eriksons “breached their duty of loyalty to the 
corporation by usurping a corporate opportunity.”212  No mincing between having 
                                                            
rejected this argument, citing the majority shareholders’ right to  
vote their shares in their own interest. They are limited only by any fiduciary 
duty owed to other stockholders. It is not objectionable that their motives may be 
for personal profit, or determined by whim or caprice, so long as they violate no 
duty owed other shareholders.  Clearly, a stockholder is under no duty to sell its 
holdings in a corporation, even if it is a majority shareholder, merely because the 
sale would profit the minority. 
Id. at 845 (citations omitted).  The court found that Dorr-Oliver was “not for sale” because Curtiss-
Wright had no interest in selling it; therefore, an auction would have been futile.  Id.  The court required 
Curtiss-Wright to act with fairness in the merger, however.  Id. at 845–48.  The court determined that 
Bershad had been treated fairly and dismissed Bershad’s claims but remanded for disposition of the 
fairness claim with respect to other potential members of a plaintiff class.  Id. 
211 Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 974 (Del.Ch. 
2003). 
212 Christman v. Brauvin Realty Advisors, Inc., 80 F.Supp.2d 808, 814 (N.D.Ill. 1999). 
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an interest in the opportunity and whether it “fairly belonged” to the corporation. 
The Delaware Chancellor similarly cut through the thicket of criss-crossed 
signals when deciding In re Digex Inc. Shareholders Litigation.213  There, 
WorldCom was interested in buying Digex, Inc., but at the last moment transferred 
its interest to Digex’s parent corporation, Intermedia.214  The Chancellor declared 
Thorpe instructive and announced that it would “guide this Court in determining 
whether the defendants have breached a duty of loyalty owed to the plaintiffs.”215  
Then the Chancellor recited all the Eriksons’ lack of candor.  In noting how section 
271 did not stand in the way of liability for the majority shareholder in In re Digex, 
the court judiciously quoted all of the language from Thorpe about how section 
271 is subordinate to the duty of loyalty.216  The court said nothing of section 
271’s supposed independent legal significance, nothing about the absolute rights of 
shareholders to vote their own interests, and nothing about who owned the 
corporate opportunity.217  It seems a somewhat convenient lapse of memory, but 
perhaps some things are better forgotten. 
In another case, the Delaware Chancery turned Thorpe into an endorsement 
of damages for disloyal conduct, despite Delaware’s efforts to find reasons not to 
impose them on the Eriksons.  In In re Primedia, Inc. Derivative Litigation,218 
shareholders alleged that “the controlling stockholder, through an investment 
vehicle that it managed and held an equity interest in, purchased large amounts of 
the corporation’s outstanding preferred stock at substantial discounts to par 
value.”219  Then, by exerting influence over the corporation’s board, the 
stockholder caused the corporation to “call the preferred stock at its full 
redemption price years before the corporation was contractually obligated to do 
so.”220  In this, the controlling stockholder profited greatly to the exclusion of other 
common shareholders. 
After determining that the plaintiff’s complaint adequately alleged a breach 
of the duty of loyalty, the court asked whether the complaint adequately alleged an 
injury to the corporation.  In answering “yes,” the court relied on Thorpe’s wisdom 
as to damages for breach of loyalty: 
If the plaintiffs ultimately prove such a breach of the duty of loyalty, this court 
should not unduly narrow the scope of their recovery.  Even in a case where 
transactional damages are not present, a disloyal fiduciary may still be held liable 
for incidental damages.  Concerns of equity and deterrence justify “loosen[ing] 
normally stringent requirements of causation and damages” when a breach of the 
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duty of loyalty is shown.221 
So, in the Chancery court’s rhetoric, Thorpe no longer means hesitancy in 
imposing damages for breach of loyalty; Thorpe means “full speed ahead.” 
Finally, when the right of owners to trump the duty of loyalty was argued, 
the Chancery fled from Thorpe, distinguishing it as the harmless decision it should 
have been.  Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Properties, LLC222 involved a power 
struggle between a LLC’s majority owner and minority interests.  The Gatz family 
owned farm property on Long Island that they wished to develop as a golf 
course.223  William Gatz approached Auriga Capital and others, and Auriga agreed 
to obtain financing and assist with construction.224  The parties formed a limited 
liability company, Peconic Bay, LLC (“Peconic”), to take a lease from the Gatzes, 
sublease the property to a golf course operator, and handle the resulting cash rent 
and other proceeds that would flow back to the investors and the lessors, the 
Gatzes.225  The Gatzes took a high percentage ownership in Peconic; they later 
purchased other owners’ interests that gave the Gatz family veto rights to 
fundamental transactions such as subleasing the course long-term or selling 
Peconic.226 
The course was constructed and subleased initially to American Golf 
Corporation.227  High expectations in the course’s profitability did not 
materialize.228  Long before the sublease ended, William Gatz began to speculate 
that the course property might be worth more as a residential community than as a 
golf course.  So rather than find a new operator or sell the course to someone who 
would maximize its value as a golf course, Gatz “did not search for a replacement 
management corporation, explore whether the LLC itself could manage the golf 
course profitably, or undertake to search for a buyer for the LLC.”229  Instead, he 
tried to obstruct any movement that might allow the minority interests to profit 
from their investment; Gatz turned away potential buyers and conducted a sham 
auction in which the only real bid—a very low bid—came from the Gatz family 
interests.230  William Gatz tried to construct a circumstance in which the minority 
interests would be forced to sell out to the Gatz family at a low price. 
Gatz’s defense for this disloyal conduct was Thorpe-ish: “The manager’s 
defense [was] that his voting power gave him a license to exploit the 
minority . . . .”231  Or, as Gatz put it in his post-trial motion, 
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It is black letter law that Gatz Properties had no obligation to vote in favor of a new 
operator or operating the course itself.  Gatz Properties had majority voting control, 
a right which was bargained for . . . and . . . [of] which all minority members were 
aware. . . .  Controlling shareholders, while not allowed to use their control . . . to 
exploit the minority, are not required to act altruistically towards them.  Gatz 
Properties, therefore, had the right to veto any transaction by a third party, a right 
which all parties knew about.232 
Notwithstanding the clear invitation to make something of Thorpe’s twisted 
language, Chancellor Strine declined.  His treatment of Thorpe in response to 
Gatz’s argument attempts to put the case’s rhetorical discrepancies in the past.  
Strine used Thorpe against Gatz: “Gatz, of course, had no duty to sell his interests.  
But the fact that he was not a seller does not mean that he had a free license to 
mismanage Peconic Bay so as to deliver it to himself at an unfair price.”233  In 
other words, what the Chancery recognized of Thorpe is the good side of it, the 
side that gives loyalty its due.  This is good news.  While Thorpe survives on its 
facts and one side of its logic lives on, Auriga Capital Corp. gives hope that 
Thorpe’s contradictions and other troublesome rhetoric can someday be safely 
forgotten.  I commend Chancellor Strine’s treatment of the case.  May all such 
attempts at claiming the duty of loyalty has been trumped be forgotten by later 
courts¸ and may no court attempt it again. 
V. CONCLUSION 
As this paper demonstrates, attempts to explain away disloyalty by claiming 
that otherwise disloyal fiduciaries were acting pursuant to a right that trumps 
loyalty are deeply flawed. 
Where the argument is found, various kinds of faulty reasoning attend it.  
Most obviously, trumping arguments risk inconsistency.  It is difficult to pay 
homage to loyalty, on the one hand, a move that comes in handy next time a court 
has to require damages of a cheating fiduciary, and on the other hand justify 
disregarding loyalty on the basis of a supposed right the fiduciary and others like it 
have always had.  Covalt, Beatty, and Thorpe as opinions all suffer from this 
serious defect.  
The rationale of trumping is conceptually antithetical to fiduciary duty itself.  
Fiduciary duty is necessary because the fiduciary has power by right.  This is true 
no matter the source of the fiduciary duty, whether contract or relation.  Under a 
contractual theory, the trumping exonerates what should be a breach of the 
contract, and, under a relational theory, the fiduciary is allowed to abuse the 
beneficiary.  Yet the power of partners to manage and the power of majority 
shareholders to vote is the reason fiduciary duty is appropriate.  There should be 
inconsistency in allowing the rights that require the existence of a fiduciary duty to 
trump the duty itself.  Decisions ignoring this inconsistency are doomed to repeat 
it. 
The trumping argument is also a slippery slope: Deciding that a right trumps 
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loyalty invites fiduciaries to expand the exception with behavior that soon becomes 
opportunistic. 
At worst, the trumping language is a kind of hyperbole.  Inasmuch as later 
courts take is seriously, it has the potential to allow serious injustice.  Inasmuch as 
later courts do not take it seriously, they still must respond to counsel’s arguments 
trying to hide their clients behind it.  Lower courts and even the deciding court 
itself may spend decades carefully cabining the hyperbole’s effect by ignoring it 
and citing only the language of the trumping opinion that makes sense and is 
defensible.  Lawyers practicing before the court may take decades to get the hint.  
In the end, the final fault of the trumping rationale is that the true grounds for 
decision remain hidden.  None of the results reached by the three opinions studied 
here are incorrect.  But the rationale that justifies each result without confusion or 
controversy remains hidden because judges allowed the trumping argument to 
persuade them, or at least to allow them to stop thinking before articulating a less 
problematic ground for decision. 
I believe these kinds of decisions are relatively rare.  For the most part, 
judges do not engage in this kind of thinking.  They never should. 
